Tagged: being

The Boundaries of Existence

The Being of beings is disclosed not in the average everyday participation by which any given being is involved with its world; nor is Being that which is reducible simply to a mere “presence,” an occupation of lived space and time.

Rather, Being itself unveils itself as it is only at the boundaries of existence. Whereas average everydayness is constituted in the perpetual cycling through the proverbial motions, the true nature of Being is only made manifest as disclosed through the absurd paradoxes of Being generally — available only at transcendence of the very boundaries of what it means for anything to be anything at all. 

The confrontation with Being at the boundaries of existence takes place as a “clearing,” or a cutting-off from the average everyday manner by which Being is forgotten, lost amid the nauseating sameness of one’s fallenness. The experience of the boundaries of existence is a coming to the fore of that which was previously concealed — and in this very unconcealment one comes face to face with that “uncanniest of all guests” — the dreaded nothingness.

The crossroad of nothingness takes form as a paroxysm of Being — Kierkegaard’s dread or Heidegger’s angst, or the blackest melancholy upon which all is swept away. It is here that one encounters the liminal space and temporality of Being as it is; a paradoxical twilight between being and non-being; something and nothing; the real and the unreal; never-was and never-to-become. Everything is possible and equally impossible; the conflagration in which all is reduced to unidentifiable rubble and properly discarded into the dustbin of history.

Like the contours of a silhouette or the distinctive edges of the shadow casting itself against the wall, the boundaries of existence differentiate the is from the is-not; and has at the same time the tendency to reveal everything as an in-vain. This is precisely the encounter Schopenhauer had in mind, despite his inability to break free from Kant’s transcendental gaze. Yet Herr Schopenhauer’s insight into the irrational structure of desire is both telling and revealing — whether at the whim of our forgetfulness of being or the aimless drive of the will to live, the sheer pointlessness of it all only becomes clear at the margins, and must necessarily remain hidden lest we give in to annihilation and complete destruction.

Like a wrecking ball whose sole aim rests in its destruction of the most abiding structures and forms, the nothing clears away all illusions, constructs, and hope. The paradox of this very encounter reveals the worthlessness of all that is; the clearing the way for which Being is understood primordially as it is, and forever will be — in and of its total nothingness.

The experience of being drawn into the boundary of existence draws forth the contours of naked existence as such — disclosing itself through the existential structures of temporality, spatiality, and relatedness — each appearing as aimless form, absent all concrete content, upon which the entirety of one’s existence is an endless process by which content is given in accordance with being-in-the-world. .

What then does this “uncanniest” of all guests reveal? Nothing, nothing, and more nothing. It is by virtue of the nothingness of Being that Being may be understood at all; an endless cycling of existence’s peculiar paradoxes revealing the vanity of it all: all activity naught; all meaning illusory…while at at the same time a universal negation — a raising up of the worst in its totalizing capacity to break away from the confines of the average, common, and everyday. The totality of the nothing is the sensation of the proverbial cup of life neither half empty nor half-full…but overflowing with the smoldering excrement of existence; the task of existence reduced to the futility of ascending the dung heap of life.

The nothingness of Being is the coming-into-being of nothingness. That upon which one encounters Being itself as nothing but oblivion or abyss, stranded in the constant flux of forever becoming. It is here that Nietzsche’s prognosis of the overcoming of nihilism reflects his own prejudiced naivety for an activist response to the nothingness. The unanniness of nihilism rests in its being the default structure upon which any and everything is grounded, and not, as Nietzsche presupposes, in the positing of the highest values that, in their own peculiar way, devalue themselves. In this sense, Nietzsche’s Dionysian or “active” nihilism is in fact incomplete — an affirmation of life that itself is constituted in a fundamental negation — the negative ontology of being resting in the negation of the nothing and giving way to the appearance of beings and their Being.

Thus, to come full circle with the nothingness requires the negation of the negation — and therefore can only become manifest in a negative return to nothingness. It is in this respect that Schopenhauer (and the later Cioran) offer a more tenable response to nihilism than Nietzsche, despite both of their intimate relationship to the latter’s body of thought.

The Nietzschean Overman  is as much beguiled by the illusion of positing new values that he no longer is able to sustain his intimate relationship with the nothing, but must instead re-cast her in the un-ending task of re-valuation. But such revaluation of values is nonetheless a retreat from nihilism — indeed as Nietzsche himself intended. This is all the more so on account of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism as the devaluation of the highest values. The devaluation of the Christian values necessarily entailed the positing of a new value system — one that was capable of providing a resounding “yes” to this life and simultaneously embracing the nightmarish eternal return of the same. Within the broader framework of Nietzsche’s philosophical thought, nihilism is something to be overcome. But this is so only insofar as nihilism is understood in the realm of valuation. But nihilism understood as such fundamentally misses something deeper than the phenomena of the devaluation of all values — a concealment of the nothing as it is directly in ontology.

It is precisely in this manner that Nietzsche, who deserves the utmost credit for his original investigations into nihilism, nevertheless misses the mark….his Herculean revaluation of all values taking aim at only one particular manifestation of nothingness, yet altogether turning away from. and thus re-concealing the nothingness of Being. For affirmation of the nothingness can only take form in the negation of the negation of the understanding of Being, and therefore the response to nihilism must itself be a negative — and never a positive. The paradoxical nature of an affirmative negation is the cornerstone of human being’s relation to its Being, constituted solely at the boundaries of existence.

The nature of existence in boredom

If it is at all possible to measure the real value that inheres within life, then one must remove all contingencies and qualifications. This would require the possibility of an experience of naked existence as such.

To my knowledge, there is only one condition in which such an experience is possible, this is boredom. In boredom, one becomes lost in the present; separated from that which is meaningful to the individual in terms of his being possible. In the most extreme cases of boredom, one even loses one’s relation to his own self, and becomes free-floating “presence.” Boredom is epitomized by a break-down in intelligibility and meaning. Instead,the ubiquitous and inarticulable background practices that give us any understanding of what it means for anything to be anything at all come to the fore. Their vanity exposed, and having now become within the grasp of the understanding, are no longer to provide the foundation for the individual’s understanding of being. Thus, in consequence of the coming-to-the-fore of that by which anything is made meaningful at all, the self’s relation to everything that is, was, or could be, whether entities or the world generally, fades away into the background and one is left with existing as mere presence.

The onset of the most dreadful boredom thus amounts to our coming-to-terms with the nothingness of existence. When we are no longer able to rely on that which we previously relied upon to provide us with our most fundamental and pre-ontological understanding of being renders us hopelessly lost and alienated from all meaning in the world. In extreme boredom, what was previously concealed within the backdrop of our pre-ontological understanding of being is unconcealed, and thus manifests in a “clearing” by which we are forced to stare the abyss of existence in the face.

Only at this stage can we begin to develop an understanding of the worthiness (or lack thereof) in existence as such. Boredom thus takes on the task of stripping away the cultural practices upon which we take for granted as a necessary structure for our being-in-the-world. Accordingly, when our pre-ontological understanding of what it means “to be” is cleared away and naked existence presents itself as it is in its own, as is the case in acute boredom, it becomes possible to take notice of being without the imposition of the existential structure by which we are “given” on account of our thrownness in the world.  Absent the necessary features of a “world,” this “breakdown” accordingly represents leaves us in a complete state of un-relation; where the individual has now lost his ability to relate to anything in a meaningful way.

The nothingness revealed by boredom makes all the more sense when we step back and consider the distressing nature of ennui generally. Often, human being is willing to go to great and exceptional lengths to escape boredom, including risking life and limb. Romanian philosopher Emil Cioran once said that the remedy for boredom is “fear,” and indeed this seems correct, insofar as the remedy need be of greater quality and strength than the disorder. But the fact that some people are driven to take incredible risks for no other reason than to pre-occupy themselves is a telling illustration. While by no means dispositive, it goes a long way in confirming our suspicion’s about existence itself as revealed through the paradoxical paroxysm of boredom.

This is all possible in the first place on account of boredom being a particular, if not somewhat “special” and revealing type of mood. Moods represent our “affectedness” to being, and thus in reflecting upon our moods, allow us to better comprehend the way in which we are receptive to being. If we’re willing to listen, then certain moods, such as boredom, despair, anxiety, etc., are capable of disclosing primordial truths with respect to being. In boredom, as in other existential moods, we no longer see ourselves in our technological understanding of being, where everything exists as function to be utilized by us towards some end. Only in our receptivity to this disclosing feature of our moods are we able to draw upon that which is revealed in order to truly “learn” something about human being generally.

Thus, in boredom, the vanity of existence becomes manifest and only when we’re prepared to listen to this message does it become clear that all is naught. That most of us are unwilling, unprepared, or incapable of extending the necessary receptiveness to the truth within boredom is exemplified in the way in which we commonly respond to boredom, and thus place ourselves back into the endless antagonism between boredom and suffering generally. It is our despair over boredom that engenders us to re-establish our relation to the world, and ignore boredom’s fundamental revelation that our existence is altogether pointless. Thus, in escaping boredom, one “falls back” into to the average everyday  meaningfulness by which one becomes engaged in the futility of existence.

Yet in the end, boredom is an inescapable part of what it means to “be” the type of beings we are generally. Schopenhauer’s insight that all of existence consists in an eternal oscillation between boredom and suffering seems more prevalent in the present age than perhaps any previous epoch. With an attention span that appears to be measured in nano-seconds, we are perpetually bombarded with  sensory stimulation to satisfy our deep craving for distraction. On the other hand, we continue to strive after and pursue our pointless goals and futile aspirations, and thus expose ourselves to the inherent agony encapsulated within. And so we are always at the mercy of boredom or misery. Only by virtue of our unwillingness or inability to take note of what’s revealed in boredom are we able to delude ourselves to continuing on any further.

On the Threefold Cycle of Suffering

All of human existence, when viewed from the whole, is the eternal repetition of a three-fold cycle that we may call “suffering.” Within this cycle, human beings are thrust between inter-related stages of misery that constitute our lamentable condition of being-in-the-world. This primordial suffering, in turn, finds equal expression through the existential structure of lived time.

This cycle of suffering in turn is grounded in our being in time. Accordingly, it rests upon a necessary relationship with the type of beings for whom we are -in which we experience the subjectivity of our being-there grounded in (existential) temporality.

It’s no coincidence that the cycle of suffering shares a similar structure with lived time. This is necessarily so because it is our primordial relationship with our being-ness as expressed through time itself that invites us to suffer in the first place. Accordingly, the threefold cycle of suffering parallels the structure by which we exist in time, namely:

– Striving (future): striving refers to the type of suffering grounded in the individual’s concern for itself stretched through time, into an indefinite and temporal future. Human beings do not see themselves as merely existing in the present; rather, their being matters to them, and they take up this concern for existence through their own possibilities (projected into the future).

Thus, for each and every individual, it is his own future being that becomes primary. He is constantly re-affirming himself through his future possibilities; accordingly, his anticipation of the future determines his present course of action and disposition towards himself as he conceives himself, his past awareness of himself, and the world in which he always already finds himself.

It is the anticipation of future possibilities coming into actuality in which this level of suffering takes shape. Insofar as he anticipates a particular outcome or possibility, the individual must necessarily acknowledge a deficiency in his current being-in-the-world. If I set out to become a distinguished professor, it necessarily follows that I must acknowledge myself now as not a distinguished professor. Insofar as I make this my project, it becomes my meaningful commitment for my being. But, insofar as I remain unsatisfied in the completion of my project, I am less than the expectation that I set for myself.

The suffering of striving is increased by virtue of the fact that I never am my projects. One does not attain the rank of “distinguished professor” and then simply stop as if the mere recognition of status were simply enough; rather, one must continuously do what a distinguished professor does. If I do not write, research, have any students, or partake in the activities for which it means to be a distinguished professor — then I am not a distinguished professor.

Thus, the projects and goals for which we strive for are never truly “complete,” and thus we never attain the satisfaction of what we think it means “to be” that which we sought ought to become. Instead, we are suspended in perpetual becoming — never centered or grounded in our being but rather undergoing the arduous process of re-affirming our individual commitment to our defining projects. In short, I will never “be” a distinguished professor; rather, I will always forever find myself “becoming” a distinguished professor, despite the contrary conclusion which may be drawn from our ordinary usage of the verb “be.”

Likewise, striving always puts us at a grave risk for frustration, failure, and disappointment.  In this sense, striving always puts the individual at the risk of not achieving that which he sought ought to become, giving rise then to feelings of disappointment, disenchantment, or other negative feelings towards one’s self and the world. With sufficient regularity, such disappointment or frustration can lead to a rejection of striving and total detachment from the possibilities that give rise to one’s meaningful relation to himself.

– Anguish (past): Anguish is the level of suffering centered in the past. It is the expression of disharmony or imbalance within the self and its relation to the world and/or its own self. However, it should be noted that anguish need not necessarily manifest itself as a form of suffering about or over the past, though it certainly is possible (as in the feeling of regret).

Rather, in anguish, there is a breakdown in the self’s reflective relation to its past as the defining source of the content of its own self and its correlative worth to itself. Insofar as I can know myself, it is to the extent that I am capable of seeing myself as having a definite past, in which I interpret as a whole that which constitutes and gives intelligible meaning to my concrete and individual existence. Thus, the “I” (insofar as this may be said to exist) is not merely the material constituent parts that make up my body as it “exists” in space and time; nor is it the “mental stuff” for which my personality, my experience, my interiority are merely objective manifestations of; rather, the “I” is the expression of my relation to my own self as it relates to itself through existential or lived time.

When I reflect on my individual past, I recall specific memories. For me, these are never general nor abstract, but always concrete; this is so because (to me) they did not  happen to an amorphous “someone,” but rather the concrete me — a subjectively existing individual whose being matters for him. In this way, I am able to derive from my own relation to my past in lived-time that it was the same “I” that occupies my memories as the “I” that is thinking about those memories now.

This complex series of relations in which the very “mine-ness” of my own self is made possible is always vulnerable to categorical break-downs. It is in these “breakdowns” in the self’s relationship to itself that the suffering of anguish takes form. For instance, I may lose all connection to myself as a self, or perhaps never become aware of myself as a self (and thus not be a self); I may recognize myself as a self but reject becoming myself.  In its concrete forms, anguish gives rise to moods focusing on hyper-reflection inwards and onto the self, such as despair, certain forms of depression, melancholy, and other acute or chronic expressions of discordant relations of the self.

– Boredom (present): Boredom, as the third form of suffering, is unique in that it generally is understood not on account of any particular content or attributes which distinguish it from the other levels of suffering, but rather, its form. Generally speaking, boredom is the withdrawal of the related meaningfulness of being-in-the-world.

Boredom itself can be sub-divided into three distinctive stages, all of which represent, to varying degrees of intensity, the aforementioned withdrawal of individual meaning — either meaning in the world, meaning within the self, or total collapse of all meaning into nothginess. For more on the specific levels of boredom, click here.

From his lamentable birth to his lonely death, all individual human beings are thrown about within this cycle, tossed between each stage with neither purpose nor reason. The relationship between time and the cycle of suffering is expressed trough the type of beings we are — for we are the type of beings who care about our being-in-the-world.

Accordingly we are always already immersed within this cycle due to the ontological structure of being itself. Thus, what Heidegger called the “Care” structure, may properly be understood as the “root” or “grounding” of existential suffering.

Furthermore, there is no “progression” or hierarchy of suffering; this is so because it is cyclical, not linear. One does not undergo any growth or transfiguration between striving and anguish; anguish and boredom; or boredom and striving. Each stage is itself both self-sufficient but at the same time co-related to the next, and human existence as such is destined to exist through each stage, forever repeating itself.

This three-fold cycle expresses itself through our disposedness to the world, or rather, our “moods.” Our moods disclose to us (and, when articulated, to others) how it’s going in the world. Our moods reflect our insights into our own being-in-the-world, and thus are never entirely interior or affective mental states.

Certain moods express more clearly which stage of suffering any given individual may be experiencing. For instance, anxiety or dread is an expression of striving (future); whereas despair and sadness are expressions of anguish (past). Moreover, the vast complex of moods can express a simultaneous overlapping of different levels of suffering. For example, general melancholy may be found primarily in anguish, but certain forms may express all three stages of suffering.

 

Temporality and the Self

The difference between man and other entities is the former’s sense of temporality. In other words, man’s own self-awareness  of himself as existing — or, as Heidegger puts it: Dasein is the being for whom Being is an issue for it. Other entities, be it a dog, raccoon, elephant or a tea-pot, are incapable of projecting their being into the future; or recalling their own  past. Lower species live exclusively in the present; for the very moment in which being finds itself. Only man can experience himself in time, and thus never truly static; but rather in a  constant state of becoming himself through his finite possibility.

But possibility is understood in contrast to actuality. The traditional positing of the Self-as-substance (i.e., Descartes, Kant, substance ontology generally, etc.) places actuality over possibility; an emphasis of the present-now over the to be/becoming.  Substance ontology, in turn, reduces the individual into little more than universalized substance — an entity (albeit, a thinking entity), composed of the same indistinguishable “stuff” (spirit; mind;  soul; will to power; etc.). It was this aspect of traditional metaphysics that Soren Kierkegaard, and later Martin Heidegger, went to great lengths to overcome.

Above all, focusing on the present-substance completely misses what it means to be-in-the-world. This analysis simply ignores, or is incapable of taking account of the very fact that we are always in the world relating to it. Heidegger chooses to focus on our “average everydayness” because it is our situational mode of being in the world. In other words, the traditional metaphysical (substance-ontological) view reduces existence to presence; here-now. In the end, it attempts to ground essence without taking into account our existence is to completely disregarded the finiteness of being.

Thus, the temporal self is, in its existence, its own being-towards-possibility: actively involved and always ahead of itself for which its own being matters.  We are constantly relating ourselves to the world through ourselves (the self-referential self). Thus, our existence, the relation in which our being is an issue for us. As self-relating entities, we are always encountering the future of possibilities — and if our existence is authentic — then it is our ownmost possibilities.

Properly understood, the Self is neither substance nor statically present — but rather, exists through itself as the positive relation to the world as a projection of constant change always already emerging into possibility [not actuality]. Thus, actuality is becoming possibility — always in a state of constant projection in which each individual Self is always a step in front of itself. It is in this process that each Self comes to understand its own Being: the Being of the Self is the disclosure of the “ability-to-be.”  The ability-to-be one’s Self is thus the primordial task of any individual Self insofar as he is said to exists. Likewise, any “what” it means to be able to be must always already be preceded by the “who” that is answering it. To put it more succinctly, there can be no “what” I am without there first and foremost being a “who” I am.

But this is far from the end — for every Self, in its relation to itself through its possibilities, is always already undercut by an “ultimate” possibility — death. Death, understood not as mere cessation of biological life (what Heidegger called mere ‘demise’), but rather as world collapse. My death is my possibility of no more possibilities; my possibility of not being able-to-be. Coming to terms with one’s death as truly “my death” becomes possible when we experience certain existential orientations — fundamental moods that concern the “entirety of a person’s situated existence.”  These moods highlight a breakdown of average everyday “being-in-the-world,” and include anxiety/angst, boredom, and despair. Whenever the Self is delivered over to one of these moods, the Self is confronted with the terrifying possibilty that all of its possibilties are subject to a vast and omnipresent vulnerability to total destruction and collapse. This is the revelation of the nothingness of the Self; the abyss of meaninglessness that every Self finds itself situated in while being-in-the-world.

Musings on the Absurd: Temporality

Who am I, if not the sickly embodiment of my own temporality? The so-called “human condition”: that ultimately vain and ineffectual interruption of not-being, is a cruel dialectical joke; a pointless and irrevocable mistake brought about by a birth in which we had no say.

Imagine if, in the fetus stage, we possessed the power of foresight; the ability to see life as it is and all that awaited us– would we have been so repulsed, so indignant, and so disappointed at the grim prospects of existing as such that we would turn away and simply say, “nevermind!”?

That we cannot undo our birth is truly tragic. That we cannot step outside our own temporality — equally so; but this is all made worse in light of the fact that one cannot step outside one’s own conscious relation to temporality itself.

If we must have been born, would it not have been better to enter this world as a lower-form of life? To partake in the rapture of existing sans consciousness of our own temporality — that which grabs hold of the paradoxically absurd relationship between our own finite being contra infinite possibility and becoming?

Our existence is the most disconsolate, dreary, and disappointing. For we are the wretched slaves of time itself — forever caught in its indifferent whirlwinds – tossed about aimlessly between an unfortunate birth and an untimely death. The only solace is beyond our reach: to have never been at all.

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Temporal structure of the Self:

My facticity: I am always already thrown into a world; I always already was what I am.

My possibilities: I am always ahead of myself in such a way that I am the projection of my ownmost possibilities ahead of me.

My existence: I am always already in the world, always already what I am/was/will be, and always ahead of myself projecting my own self onto my own possibilities.