There are few who would deny Heidegger his rightful place as the most influential and important philosopher of the Twentieth Century; it is equally undeniable that Heidegger was at the same time one of the most controversial thinkers of his time. As a thinker, Heidegger set about to deconstruct the entire history of Western philosophy – dislodging the tradition of metaphysics-as-presence and setting a groundbreaking new path towards originary thinking that continues to be felt long after his demise. Yet, Heidegger was also extremely controversial outside of his role as thinker – but also as a living, concrete individual who found himself engaged in the most fascinating and demanding of times. Nowadays, in the wake of the explosion of scholarship delving into Heidegger’s association and involvement with German National Socialism, it is seemingly impossible for any serious student of Heidegger’s thought to ignore this feature of both the philosopher and his philosophy.
Yet at the same time, much of the existing scholarship is fundamentally inadequate – committing itself to following a path that Heidegger himself would’ve surely criticized for having utterly missed the point. Beginning with Farias’ book, Heidegger et la Nazism, all the way through Faye’s Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy (2009)– the debate surrounding “Heidegger and Nazism” has largely polarized into two opposing camps: his critics who claim that Heidegger’s affiliation with National Socialism was a “natural” consequent stemming or deriving from his philosophy; versus his supporters, who largely claim that Heidegger’s preoccupation with National Socialism was a “personal error” or mistake – the actions of a great thinker who simply lacked political acumen.
That the very structure of this discursive endeavor has degenerated into such an artificial dichotomy presents itself as a significant obstacle standing in the way to any further understanding of the complex relationship between Heidegger’s thought on the one hand, and National Socialism as an historical phenomenon on the other. Worst of all are those attempts by the likes of Victor Farias which betray a complete lack of effort to fully engage with Heidegger’s thought; but moreover, insofar as one treats historical phenomena as mere “present-to-hand,” one artificially (and superficially) strips the phenomena of that upon-which such phenomena was constituted (made possible) in the first place. In other words – the very attempt to study Heidegger as a concrete individual confronted with the calling of his time through the lens of dispassionate and objective historical science misses an important piece of this never-ending controversy.
The “Heidegger and Nazism” controversy almost exclusively takes as its starting point the proposition that National Socialism is, was, and always has been, something that needs to be denounced, thoroughly discredited, or de-legitimized less one becomes labeled a “revisionst,” or worst – sympathetic with National Socialist ideals. This is not only patently absurd, but represents a great disservice to genuine scholarship and thinking. That modern day historical discourse with respect to National Socialism has the tendency to reduce that event as synonymous with genocide and mass-murder, war and destruction, is to trivialize National Socialism and conceal its importance as an epoch-defining moment in Twentieth Century history. In short, the entire framework of the discourse of National Socialism operates merely at the level of ontical-valuation. Such a framework is problematic in particular because it fails to take account for the very ontological, as opposed to ontic, meaning by which Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism took place. Likewise, it has the particularly un-helpful effect of reducing the complexities of National Socialism as unique historical phenomena and thereby “annihilating” any genuine understanding with regards to an otherwise incredibly serious subject matter. This much can be accounted for by the attempt to constrain National Socialism within the delimitations of the progressivist-historical narrative and liberal-democratic ideology. Thus, the interpretation of National Socialism was always already premised on a series of particular, albeit un-defined, presuppositions. Consequently, it follows that the dominant narrative constrains the horizon upon which National Socialism is subsequently interpreted as always already something “evil,” “monstrous,” and “repulsive.” National Socialism, if one begins from the presuppositions of the liberal-democratic ideology and progressivist historical narrative, is an aberration, a suspension from the normal course of events upon which human consciousness marches teleologically towards ultimate Enlightenment and universal the humanitarian ideal.
But restricting the interpretation of National Socialism to this extant narrative renders such interpretations fundamentally flawed for two critical reasons. First, this narrative takes itself to be objective, and therefore always already privileges the meaning upon-which it itself imposes on the historical phenomena – thus concealing its own fatalistic approach to historical interpretation. The progressivist-historical narrative interprets in a manner fundamentally incapable of truly coming to an understanding with the “meaning” of National Socialism that may have appeared to Heidegger – and countless other Germans of that particular point in time – as the “inner truth and greatness” of the movement. Focusing exclusively on National Socialism as a doctrine and philosophico-political expression of racialist supremacy and state terrorism is about as useful as reading the Wikipedia entry for Being and Time and allowing yourself to be convinced that you “understand” the intricacies and radical possibilities set forth in that publication. In other words – the failure to have a meaningful discussion with respect to Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism is in part on account of a failure to truly grasp National Socialism not only in its actuality, but in the wholeness of its totality.
To fully grasp the significance of National Socialism as historical-phenomenon one simply cannot take the all-too convenient route of de-contextualizing National Socialism’s origins – how it came to be, and that upon-which National Socialism represented itself as the authentic destiny of the German Volk. To miss this piece of the puzzle seems, at least to me, to miss the entire point of Heidegger’s association and interest in National Socialism. For Heidegger’s own association, and later confrontation, with National Socialism always took place within the context of the historicity of the German Volk. More specifically, National Socialism represented the subtle yet complex inter-play between repetition and retrieval of the German Volk whose essence is futural as futural retrieval of the chthonic – its ownmost subterranean rootedness in the Earth.
At the same time, to separate National Socialism from the discourse surrounding the history and trajectory of Western nihilism equally fails to take full account of National Socialism as historical phenomena. In 1933, Heidegger saw in National Socialism the “counter-movement” to Western technological nihilism – a retrieval of the ancient Pre-Socratic Greek way of originary thinking the question of Being as projected into the futurity of the German Volk; only later, however, when National Socialism failed to live up to Heidegger’s expectation of a second “ontological” revolution, did he fully see that National Socialism always already was impregnated with the most destructive type of subjectivism and nihilistic “will to will” of the Western tradition. Indeed, this was the very paradox of National Socialism, which always found itself caught in the midst of a perplexing dialogue with itself in relation to its historical significance: both a counter-movement to nihilism while at the same time nihilistic itself. On the one hand, National Socialism was always-already defined by its hostility to the tradition, particularly in its hostility to the Enlightenment ideals of universal humanism and the explicit tradition of the French Revolution; however, whether or not this would inevitably translate into providing a springboard for Heidegger’s anticipation of the coming of a “new beginning” is another matter altogether. What is clear, however, is that even before the onset of War, Heidegger’s own relationship to National Socialism, and perhaps the broader political dimensions of Heidegger’s thought, underwent what Julian Young has called a transition from the “activist” rhetoric and thinking of Heidegger circa 1933-34 (the days of the Rectorate) to a more quiestist and passive engagement in the form of Gelassenheit.
Nevertheless, no matter how our own post-National Socialism historical narrative depicts Heidegger and/or National Socialism, it is beyond dispute that Heidegger was no “ordinary Nazi.” For example, Heidegger was never a convinced biological-racist. Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures demonstrate this point – as evidenced in his attempt to provide a counter-interpretation of Nietzsche to the predominantly biologistic-naturalistic interpretation offered by the leading German Nietzsche scholar and Heidegger’s contemporary, Alfred Baeumler. To be fair, it must be conceded that both Heidegger and Baeumler, despite their very significant differences, did belong to a shared historical context that emerged in the wake of the Great War, premised on a vision that saw within National Socialism a re-turn to the autochthonous and rootedness of the German Volk in the soil, and the retrieval of the arche as projected into the opening-up of an-other beginning. Yet, in the first half of the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger will see in Nietzsche himself the ending-as-beginning, and will re-emphasize Nietzsche’s emphasis on “Being,” as opposed to “Values,” as was the case in Baeumler et. al – only later to see in Nietzsche the very destructiveness of the nihilistic “will to will” long at work within the history of the West — a fatal error that Heidegger also saw developing within National Socialism that would end in the total destruction of Germany at the hands of the Allies by the end of the War.
Heidegger was never a “National Socialist” in the way in which that term implies adherence to the NSDAP’s main party platform; indeed, Heidegger never fully embraced the standard NSDAP line, but rather devised what Carl von Weizsacker called “Freiburg National Socialism.” Heidegger never embraced or accepted the dominant “worldview” (Weltanschauung). Heidegger’s idiosyncratic approach to the question of National Socialism would even put him at odds with major National Socialist ideologues and philosophers, including Rosenberg, Baeumler, Krieck and others. He also rejected the founding of a new mythos for German Dasein rooted in the Volkisch mythos of the Aryan Master Race– but rather in the autochthonous founding of a new-beginning rooted in the originary thinking and openness to the question of Being of Heraclitus and the pre-Socratics.
Moreover, Heidegger never fully identified himself with the Revolution of 1933 which saw Adolf Hitler ascend to the position of Chancellor of the Reich. According to Charles Bambach, in his highly-detailed and thought-provoking work, Heidegger’s Roots, Heidegger saw the 1933 NSDAP revolution as merely the first-phase upon-which the groundwork was being laid for a second “ontological” revolution which “alone could achieve the ‘total transformation of German Dasein’” and overcome the rootlessness of Western nihilism. Such hopes for a coming ontological revolution was the cornerstone of Heidegger’s 1933 Rectoral Address, in which Heidegger saw the German University playing a fundamental and pivotal role. Thus, the “self-expression of the German University” is by no means a mere philosophical endorsement of Hitlerism as it existed in 1933; but rather, a challenge of sorts to push National Socialism beyond the politico-ontical realm and into the spiritual and ontological. It is a call for the University to take a leading role in the “spiritual” life of the Volk in the battle against the ontological decline of the West; as paving the way for the University beyond a mere institution of specialized learning into its authentic mission as the fundamental site for originary questioning. Thus, it was the University that would serve as the vanguard for the second “ontological” revolution of National Socialism.
Much of the confusion as to the intent behind the Rectoral Address is the result of Heidegger’s otherwise inflammatory language – with its many references to common National Socialist themes and terminology. But one cannot take this at face value – and as several scholars have remarked, the Address is much more couched in terms of a Nietzschean, rather than Hitlerist, dialogue. Moreover, separating the Rectoral Address from the totality of Heidegger’s engagement and eventual confrontation with National Socialism offers only a superficial interpretation, for such an interpretation leaves one in the dark as to regards what Heidegger is actually trying to say in the Rectoral Address. Even Heidegger’s references to “Blut und Boden” (Blood and Soil), which permeate the Rectoral speech, should not be constrained to the way in which these terms were formulated in the traditional National Socialist rhetoric. For Heidegger, Blut und Boden had everything to do with retrieving the ancient, autochthonous roots of German Dasein in the form of originary questioning – and not the otherwise biological framework as articulated by the more “traditional” National Socialist ideologues such as Darre.
Above all, it behooves scholars interested in the question of Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism to recognize how National Socialism as a concrete expression of German Dasein in 1933 constituted what appeared as a genuine and authentic response to the crisis of Western nihilism. This situatedness within the history of Western nihilism constituted for Heidegger what was most attractive in the National Socialist Revolution – or what he himself identified as “the inner truth and greatness” of the movement. Heidegger, for his part, was indeed as much a product of what has become known as the “ideas of 1914,” which included a radical and militantly antagonistic opposition to the “Ideas of 1789.” There is considerable evidence to suggest that Heidegger was undoubtedly influenced by the so-called “Conservative Revolution” in Germany in the inter-war years. Again, Blambach’s work is essential in understanding this point. In Heidegger’s Roots, Blambach goes to great lengths to situate Heidegger within the historical context of crisis following Germany’s humiliating defeat in World War I and the nation’s abysmal treatment at the hands of the victors. For Heidegger and many others at the time – National Socialism represented an authentic confrontation with democratic-bourgeois-liberalism on the one hand, and Bolshevism on the other; a “third-way” so-to-speak between the two nihilistic camps, which for Heidegger represented the culmination of technological nihilism (Introduction to Metaphysics). National Socialism, for its part, especially in 1933-4, represented a genuine and understandable alternative to the German Volk between two otherwise nihilistic tendencies that threatened to swallow Germany whole; it represented a constituted force and phenomena that understood itself as projecting a possibility of a new beginning outside the tradition of metaphysics-as-presence and technological nihilism.
There are many factors that likely motivated Heidegger to involve himself with National Socialism. I think German philosopher and historian Ernst Nolte (a student and family friend of Heidegger’s during the NS period) has perhaps said it best when he says that Heidegger’s motivations in 1933 were largely the result of certain philosophical assumptions and hopes; that such assumptions and hopes were a product of Heidegger’s youth and the broader cultural-philosophical milieu in which Heidegger found himself and his generation in the wake of the annihilation and devastation of the Great War.
At this juncture it must absolutely be stressed that none of the above is intended to suggest, however that there is any necessary connection between Heidegger’s thought on the one hand, and the explicitly political worldview of National Socialism. Rather, Heidegger’s involvement with the NSDAP was ultimately and fundamentally his personal doing. To attempt to draw such necessary and causal connections is exactly the problem. However, it is equally important to stress the manner in which Heidegger took seriously the problem of Western nihilism and National Socialism and not treat it as a mere “personal error” of someone caught up in the spirit of the times who simply misjudged or miscalculated the intentions of the NSDAP and National Socialism generally. What can be adduced, however, is that Heidegger’s personal and philosophical engagement with National Socialism was always a unique and idiosyncratic one; an engagement that, perhaps premised on certain expectations, hopes, and prejudices, did in fact attempt to apply his own body of thought to National Socialism as it emerged. It was not the case that Heidegger’s philosophical thought was ready-made for National Socialism – but that rather he, as a concrete existing individual, sought to situate ontological thinking within the historical, cultural, and political discourse of National Socialism.
In conclusion, if we are to have any genuine insight into the relationship between Heidegger and National Socialism, then we must do so on the terms by which such events took place. It is imperative that the phenomena of National Socialism be understood within the proper context, and not merely treated as “objective” or “present-to-hand” data by which yet another narrative may be construed –subject to the privileges and prejudices of our contemporary post-WW2 perspective. The point is not to re-construct yet another or alternative narrative; but to de-construct existing narratives, and to delineate the limitations of our historical understanding. So long as our discursive practices with regards to the question of Heidegger and Nazism operate within the framework of either indictment or exoneration, we delude ourselves into thinking that what is merely present is truth, thus concealing ourselves from a more primordial engagement with the underlying phenomena.
The Being of beings is disclosed not in the average everyday participation by which any given being is involved with its world; nor is Being that which is reducible simply to a mere “presence,” an occupation of lived space and time.
Rather, Being itself unveils itself as it is only at the boundaries of existence. Whereas average everydayness is constituted in the perpetual cycling through the proverbial motions, the true nature of Being is only made manifest as disclosed through the absurd paradoxes of Being generally — available only at transcendence of the very boundaries of what it means for anything to be anything at all.
The confrontation with Being at the boundaries of existence takes place as a “clearing,” or a cutting-off from the average everyday manner by which Being is forgotten, lost amid the nauseating sameness of one’s fallenness. The experience of the boundaries of existence is a coming to the fore of that which was previously concealed — and in this very unconcealment one comes face to face with that “uncanniest of all guests” — the dreaded nothingness.
The crossroad of nothingness takes form as a paroxysm of Being — Kierkegaard’s dread or Heidegger’s angst, or the blackest melancholy upon which all is swept away. It is here that one encounters the liminal space and temporality of Being as it is; a paradoxical twilight between being and non-being; something and nothing; the real and the unreal; never-was and never-to-become. Everything is possible and equally impossible; the conflagration in which all is reduced to unidentifiable rubble and properly discarded into the dustbin of history.
Like the contours of a silhouette or the distinctive edges of the shadow casting itself against the wall, the boundaries of existence differentiate the is from the is-not; and has at the same time the tendency to reveal everything as an in-vain. This is precisely the encounter Schopenhauer had in mind, despite his inability to break free from Kant’s transcendental gaze. Yet Herr Schopenhauer’s insight into the irrational structure of desire is both telling and revealing — whether at the whim of our forgetfulness of being or the aimless drive of the will to live, the sheer pointlessness of it all only becomes clear at the margins, and must necessarily remain hidden lest we give in to annihilation and complete destruction.
Like a wrecking ball whose sole aim rests in its destruction of the most abiding structures and forms, the nothing clears away all illusions, constructs, and hope. The paradox of this very encounter reveals the worthlessness of all that is; the clearing the way for which Being is understood primordially as it is, and forever will be — in and of its total nothingness.
The experience of being drawn into the boundary of existence draws forth the contours of naked existence as such — disclosing itself through the existential structures of temporality, spatiality, and relatedness — each appearing as aimless form, absent all concrete content, upon which the entirety of one’s existence is an endless process by which content is given in accordance with being-in-the-world. .
What then does this “uncanniest” of all guests reveal? Nothing, nothing, and more nothing. It is by virtue of the nothingness of Being that Being may be understood at all; an endless cycling of existence’s peculiar paradoxes revealing the vanity of it all: all activity naught; all meaning illusory…while at at the same time a universal negation — a raising up of the worst in its totalizing capacity to break away from the confines of the average, common, and everyday. The totality of the nothing is the sensation of the proverbial cup of life neither half empty nor half-full…but overflowing with the smoldering excrement of existence; the task of existence reduced to the futility of ascending the dung heap of life.
The nothingness of Being is the coming-into-being of nothingness. That upon which one encounters Being itself as nothing but oblivion or abyss, stranded in the constant flux of forever becoming. It is here that Nietzsche’s prognosis of the overcoming of nihilism reflects his own prejudiced naivety for an activist response to the nothingness. The unanniness of nihilism rests in its being the default structure upon which any and everything is grounded, and not, as Nietzsche presupposes, in the positing of the highest values that, in their own peculiar way, devalue themselves. In this sense, Nietzsche’s Dionysian or “active” nihilism is in fact incomplete — an affirmation of life that itself is constituted in a fundamental negation — the negative ontology of being resting in the negation of the nothing and giving way to the appearance of beings and their Being.
Thus, to come full circle with the nothingness requires the negation of the negation — and therefore can only become manifest in a negative return to nothingness. It is in this respect that Schopenhauer (and the later Cioran) offer a more tenable response to nihilism than Nietzsche, despite both of their intimate relationship to the latter’s body of thought.
The Nietzschean Overman is as much beguiled by the illusion of positing new values that he no longer is able to sustain his intimate relationship with the nothing, but must instead re-cast her in the un-ending task of re-valuation. But such revaluation of values is nonetheless a retreat from nihilism — indeed as Nietzsche himself intended. This is all the more so on account of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism as the devaluation of the highest values. The devaluation of the Christian values necessarily entailed the positing of a new value system — one that was capable of providing a resounding “yes” to this life and simultaneously embracing the nightmarish eternal return of the same. Within the broader framework of Nietzsche’s philosophical thought, nihilism is something to be overcome. But this is so only insofar as nihilism is understood in the realm of valuation. But nihilism understood as such fundamentally misses something deeper than the phenomena of the devaluation of all values — a concealment of the nothing as it is directly in ontology.
It is precisely in this manner that Nietzsche, who deserves the utmost credit for his original investigations into nihilism, nevertheless misses the mark….his Herculean revaluation of all values taking aim at only one particular manifestation of nothingness, yet altogether turning away from. and thus re-concealing the nothingness of Being. For affirmation of the nothingness can only take form in the negation of the negation of the understanding of Being, and therefore the response to nihilism must itself be a negative — and never a positive. The paradoxical nature of an affirmative negation is the cornerstone of human being’s relation to its Being, constituted solely at the boundaries of existence.
All pessimism takes the form of a negation, and necessarily so. It is a contradiction that defines itself entirely within its own contradiction; or, more aptly, it is the negation that negates its own negation; a renunciation of the resigning spirit forever doomed to negative possibility.
Pessimism is thus understood as the antithesis of all active and constructive bodies of thought; the antithesis to the rational ordering of the world and existence. Had our ancestors all been thoroughgoing pessimists, our species would have surely died out long ago.
It is the disquieting song of the tearful despair of existence… it signifies the life in which everything is rejected because only nothingness prevails.
Only pessimism possesses the intellectual honesty and integrity to admit that it itself is ultimately doomed to fail. Taken to its logical extreme then, the most radical and global form of pessimism will invariably transform itself into the most complete and tragic existential nihilism. All value, all meaning, all relations, and all of existence drowned in the abyss of infinite nothingness.
Is there any better expression of nihilism than two opposing sides of men willing to lay waste to one another — both in the name of the very same ‘Absolute?’
Unfortunately, our nihilism today is far less heroic and incomparably less tragic; but rather, our nihilism is banality par excellence. Ours is the nihilism of post-modern secular humanism run amok.
Our nihilism has disemboweled mankind. Now he lacks the stomach for the tragic; he lacks the fortitude to throw himself into the abyss of nothingness. Our man, the “last man,” the “mass-man” prefers the comforts of the sofa over Quixotic adventurism; the security of the crowd over the desolation of solitude; the utility of modern technology over authentic being.
The epoch of blonde beasts is no more — and in its place we’ve been delivered over to the epoch of mass-man, that pernicious rational maximizer of utility and comfort; security and happiness; and decadence and tranquility. This is our sickness.
Our age will be remembered as that infamous epoch which lacked sufficient imagination to even convince itself that suicide could not be a preferable option over the inconvenience of existence.
If anything might be deemed the “essence” of our existence, it is the recognition that we had no choice in its coming about. Indeed, as individual entities we had absolutely no say in our conception — nor in our being brought to term. In a word, our existence is utterly incidental to our wishes, desires, and needs. We are “thrown” into the world in which we find ourselves. This groundlessness; this miserable accident is not of our own doing. It’s the burden upon which we all were shouldered and must bear for the duration of our existence.
In our very being we are our possibilities — the ultimate of which is our own-most possibility of non-existence. The only grounding, and perhaps the most un-satisfactory grounding conceivable, is our being in time. Temporality (and by this I mean something more ‘primordial’ [to use Heidegger’s terminology] than linear, chronological time) is being. But if temporality forces us to take account of our own finitude, then our conclusion can only be that our most authentic existence is opening up the possibility for our own total collapse; our very own no-longer being.
Upon entering this realization, it becomes clear that we are thrust into existential futility; this futility is distinct from run-of-the-mill hopelessness. Rather, it is a reward — the only reward available to free us from our collective sickness: fanatic hope. Existential futility is the cure to the illusion that life has meaning; that the universe owes us something.
The only available means to fight the onslaught of existential nihilism is with nihilism’s own weaponry.
A great many philosophers have dedicated considerable amounts of their waking moments wrestling with the problem of nihilism; or more specifically, the problem of overcoming nihilism. Nevertheless, nihilism itself remains a mystery — least of all its consequences for mankind. To be sure, an adequate definition of nihilism is wanting. In the most general sense, nihilism refers to the absence of any objective, universal or intrinsic value. From this, it necessarily follows that our metaphysical beliefs, our moral/ethical values, and even our own existence, are completely and utterly lacking any inherent meaning.
As a direct consequence of nihilism, man is forced to see reality for what it is: a random, irrational, and chaotic existence in which our role is infinitesimal. Nihilism, in this capacity, serves to break down all the illusions, myths, and all other social, cultural constructions that have hitherto given us a false sense of security and hope.
In its active form, nihilism is likened to a hammer — used not only to chisel away all artificial meaning, but to smash them. Active nihilism paves the way for the creation of new values, the overcoming of the self by taking a new relation to oneself as an autonomous creator. In effect, this is the transformation of living as the “one-self,” into “my-self.” Thus, the end result of nihilism in its active form is nothing short of paving the way for the grounds to becoming my own self.
Passive nihilism, on the other hand, is epitomized by resignation; the prognosis that life is an “unprofitable episode,” (in Schopenhauer’s words). Nietzsche equated passive nihilism with Schopenhauer’s repudiation of life via the denial of the Will as a great threat. Nihilism in its passive form, while adopting the same prognosis of existence as active nihilism, thus nevertheless takes the opposite stance of active nihilism as to how we should respond to the problem of a meaningless, value-less, and chaotic existence.